

Syllabus Microeconomics II (Ph.D.)

summer term 2022

Instructor: Benny Moldovanu and Florian Brandl

- 1) Introduction to Social Choice and Mechanism Design
- 2) Bayesian and dominant strategy incentive compatibility
- 3) Efficient Implementation and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
- 4) Bilateral trade with private values
- 5) Optimal Auctions
- 6) Multidimensional mechanism design
- 7) Mechanism Design with interdependent values
- 8) Mechanism design without money
- 9) Matching and Assignment Problems

Literature:

- Mas-Collel, Whinston Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press, **Chapter 23**
- Tilman Börgers, *An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design*, Oxford University Press
- Roth, Sotomayor, *Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis*, Cambridge University Press