

# BONN ECON NEWS

Universität Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn  
<http://www.econ.uni-bonn.de>

Redaktion / Editor: Regina Haverkamp, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften  
Phone: +49 (0)228-73 2129; Fax: +49 (0)228-73 992129; email: [econnews@uni-bonn.de](mailto:econnews@uni-bonn.de)

---

## Workshops and Seminars November 23 - 27, 2020

### Tuesday, Nov 24, 2020

IZA Research Seminar

**15:00 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Pascual Restrepo Mesa**, Univ. Boston  
“Demographics and Automation”

Finance and Insurance / CRC TR 224 /  
ECONtribute Seminar

**15:00 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Sebastian Doerr**, BIS  
*tba*

Applied Micro / CRC TR 224 Workshop, in co-  
operation with briq

**16:00 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Uta Schoenberg**, UCL  
“The Effects of Changes in Business Taxation on  
Firms, Workers and Local Labor Markets”

### Wednesday, Nov 25, 2020

BGSE Brown Bag Seminar

**12:00 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Simon Block**, BGSE  
“Innovation Contests with Distinct Approaches”

**Alexander Winter**, BGSE  
"Collective decisions with partisan agents and  
correlated information"

Macro/Econometrics/Finance Seminar  
In co-operation with UCL

**12:15, via Zoom, details below**

**Fatih Guvenen**, Univ of Minnesota  
*tba*

Micro Theory / CRC TR 224 Seminar

**16:30 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Moritz Meyer-ter-Veen**, UCLA  
“Learning Dynamics in Social Networks“

### Thursday, Nov 26, 2020

Bonn MacroHistory Seminar

**16:00 CET, via Zoom, details below**

**Johannes Bugle**, HEC Lausanne  
“The Refugee’s Dilemma: Evidence from Jewish  
Migration out of Nazi Germany”

## **IZA Research Seminar**

**Pascual Restrepo Mesa**, Univ. Boston

“Demographics and Automation”

*(with Daron Acemoglu)*

Join Zoom Meeting: <https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87487213161>

Meeting ID: 874 8721 3161

### Abstract

We argue theoretically and document empirically that aging leads to greater (industrial) automation, and in particular, to more intensive use and development of robots. Using US data, we document that robots substitute for middle-aged workers (those between the ages of 36 and 55). We then show that demographic change—corresponding to an increasing ratio of older to middle-aged workers—is associated with greater adoption of robots and other automation technologies across countries and with more robotics-related activities across US commuting zones. We also provide evidence of more rapid development of automation technologies in countries undergoing greater demographic change. Our directed technological change model further predicts that the induced adoption of automation technology should be more pronounced in industries that rely more on middle-aged workers and those that present greater opportunities for automation. Both of these predictions receive support from country-industry variation in the adoption of robots. Our model also implies that the productivity implications of aging are ambiguous when technology responds to demographic change, but we should expect productivity to increase and labor share to decline relatively in industries that are most amenable to automation, and this is indeed the pattern we find in the data.

## **Finance and Insurance / CRC TR 224 / ECONtribute Seminar**

**Sebastian Doerr**, BIS

*tba*

## **Applied Micro / CRC TR 224 Workshop**

**Uta Schoenberg**, UCL

“The Effects of Changes in Business Taxation on Firms, Workers and Local Labor Markets”

*(with Mimosa de Stefano, Christian Dustmann)*

*Zoom URL will be announced via the Applied Micro mailing list*

### Abstract

This paper provides comprehensive analysis how firms, workers and local labor markets adjust to changes in business tax rates. We focus on Germany where taxes on profits that apply to both incorporated and unincorporated firms are set at the municipality level, and where there is considerable variation both across municipalities and over time. We show that an increase in the business tax rate by 1% reduces municipality employment by 0.35%, municipality wages by 0.12% and establishment wages by 0.065%. Employment decreases particularly strongly in high-wage and large establishments—that is, establishments located higher up the job ladder—explaining why municipality wages decline by more than establishment wages following a business tax hike. Moreover, higher business tax rates lower mobility between establishments, by reducing both firm separations and new hires. This leads to a reduction in between job wage growth in affected municipalities, thus suggesting reduced mobility of workers between firms as a key factor in explaining wage reductions in municipalities that experienced an increase in business taxes.

## BGSE Brown Bag Seminar

Zoom Link for both talks: <https://zoom.us/j/96045476214>

**Simon Block, BGSE**

“Innovation Contests with Distinct Approaches”

### Abstract

I introduce a model of innovation contests in the presence of distinct research approaches. In the model, successful innovations all have the same quality, irrespective of the approach that was used. Instead, the focus is on differences in the overall viability of approaches, differences in the correlation between successes within approaches, and differences in the timing of costs and possible successes. I identify two reasons why approach-independent winner-takes-all contests can induce inefficient equilibrium behavior. The first reason is high correlation of successes on the most viable approaches, and the second is that agents following fast approaches "crowd out" other agents on slower but more efficient approaches. Regarding efficiency, I show how a marginal improvement algorithm can be used to identify the social optimum under certain conditions. Most notably, an "equal costs" assumption is needed. Regarding implementation, I show that in a static setting, approach-specific prizes can be used to uniquely implement the first best and extract the entire social surplus. In contrast, with multiple periods, approach-specific prizes cannot simply be augmented with an "efficient-stopping condition" to achieve the same result.

**Alexander Winter, BGSE**

"Collective decisions with partisan agents and correlated information”

(with Deniz Kattwinkel)

### Abstract

A principal is faced with a binary decision. Which option she prefers depends on information privately held by a group of agents. Each agent's preferences are state-independent and commonly known. Can the principal design a decision rule that extracts the agents' information? We connect this question to the analysis of correlated equilibrium in a related game. A result for zero-sum games implies that information extraction is essentially impossible if agents are able to collude. We explore two possible ways out of this impasse: 1) The presence of unbiased agents whose information is correlated with that of the other agents. 2) Imperfections in the agents' ability to collude.

## Macro/Econometrics/Finance Seminar

**Fatih Guvenen, Univ of Minnesota**

*tba*

via Zoom: please contact [ypollari@uni-bonn.de](mailto:ypollari@uni-bonn.de) for further information

## Micro Theory / CRC TR 224 Seminar

**Moritz Meyer-ter-Veen, UCLA**

“Learning Dynamics in Social Networks“

(with Simon Board)

Zoom Link: <https://zoom.us/j/96045476214>

### Abstract

This paper proposes a tractable model of Bayesian learning on social networks in which agents choose whether to adopt an innovation. We consider both deterministic and random networks, and study the impact of the network structure on learning dynamics and diffusion. In directed “tree like” networks (e.g. stochastic

block networks), all direct and indirect links contribute to an agent's learning. In comparison, learning and welfare are lower in undirected networks and networks with clusters. In a broad set of networks, behavior can be captured by a small number of differential equations, making the model appropriate for empirical work.

## **Bonn MacroHistory Seminar**

**Johannes Bugle**, HEC Lausanne

“The Refugee's Dilemma: Evidence from Jewish Migration out of Nazi Germany”

**Zoom link** : <https://zoom.us/j/5234384763>

### Abstract

In this paper we estimate the push and pull factors involved in the outmigration of Jews facing persecution in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1941 when migration was banned. Our empirical investigation makes use of a unique individual-level dataset that records the migration history of almost the entire universe of Jews living in Germany over the period. Our analysis highlights new channels, specific to violent contexts, through which social networks affect the decision to flee. We first estimate a structural model of migration where individuals base their own migration decision on the observation of persecution and migration among their peers. Identification rests on exogenous variations in push and pull factors across peers who live in different cities of residence. Then we perform various counterfactual policy experiments in order to quantify how migration restrictions in destination countries affected the fate of Jews. For example, removing work restrictions for refugees after the Nuremberg Laws (in 1935) would have led to 27% increase in Jewish migration out of Germany.

**Redaktionsschluss / Deadline**  
**BONN ECON NEWS Nov 30 – Dec 04, 2020**  
**WEDNESDAY, NOV 25, 2020**  
**12:00**

BONN ECON NEWS by email (pdf):  
To subscribe or unsubscribe send E-Mail to  
[sympa@listen.uni-bonn.de](mailto:sympa@listen.uni-bonn.de)

Write in subject line “subscribe/unsubscribe econ-news Name LastName”  
and no text in body.