BONN ECON NEWS

FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

WORKSHOPS AND SEMINARS January 31 – February 04, 2022

Monday, Jan 31, 2022
BGSE-Workshop I
16:30 CET, via Zoom, details below

Evgenii Safonov, Princeton Univ.
"Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing"
"

Tuesday, Feb 01 2022
ECONtribute Law and Econ Workshop
18:00 CET, via Zoom, details below

Yassine Lefouili, TSE
"Mergers and Demand-Enhancing Innovation"

Wednesday, Feb 02, 2022
BGSE Workshop II
12:00 CET, via Zoom, details below

Alexander Winter, BGSE
"Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents"

BGSE Workshop III
16:30 CET, via Zoom, details below

Markus Möller, Univ of Cologne
"Regret-Free Truth-Telling in School Choice"

Thursday, Feb 03, 2022
BGSE Workshop IV
14:00 CET, via Zoom, details below

Akis Georgiadis-Harris, LSE
"Information Acquisition and the Timing of Actions"

Bonn MacroHistory Seminar
16:00 CET, via Zoom, details below

Tianyi Wang, Princeton Univ.
"Waves of Empowerment: Black Radio and the Civil Rights Movement"

Friday, Feb 04, 2022
YEP Seminar ECONtribute
13:00 CET, via Zoom, details below

Mark Marner-Hausen, CGS, Univ. of Cologne
"Laboratory Experiment on High Frequency Trading"

BGSE Workshop I

Evgenii Safonov, Princeton Univ.
"Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing"

Abstract

An agent needs to choose the best alternative drawn randomly with replacement from a menu of unknown composition. The agent is boundedly rational and employs an automaton decision rule: she has finitely many memory states, and, in each, she can inquire about some attribute of the currently drawn alternative and transition (possibly stochastically) either to another state or to a decision. Defining the complexity of a decision rule by the number of transitions, I study the minimal complexity of a decision rule that allows the agent to choose the best alternative from any menu with probability arbitrarily close to one. Agents in my model differ in their languages—collections of binary attributes used to describe alternatives. My first result shows that the tight lower bound on complexity among all languages is $3 \cdot \lceil \log_2 (m) \rceil$, where m is the number of alternatives valued distinctly. My second result provides a linear upper bound. Finally, I call adaptive a language that facilitates additive utility representation with the smallest number of attributes. My third result shows that an adaptive language is always simple: it admits the least complex decision rule that solves the choice problem. When $(3/4) \cdot 2n < m \le 2n$ for a natural n, a language is simple if and only if it is adaptive.

Zoom-Link: https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/96045476214?pwd=VjkvMUowVDFBeHovZmtxYVExb0d2dz09

ECONtribute Law and Econ Workshop

Yassine Lefouili, TSE
"Mergers and Demand-Enhancing Innovation"
(with M. Bourr$eau, B. Jullien)

Abstract

We study the impact of horizontal mergers on merging firms' incentives to invest in demand-enhancing innovation. In our baseline model, we identify four effects of a symmetric merger on these incentives: the innovation diversion effect, the margin expansion effect, the demand expansion effect, and the per unit return to innovation effect. We offer sufficient conditions for a merger to reduce or raise merging firms' incentives to innovate in the absence of spillovers and efficiency gains in R&D, and find that a comparison between the innovation diversion and price diversion ratios is informative about the impact of a merger on innovation.

https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/93866124430?pwd=RUM5ZWtXV3FaZjU0THh2cUpQZkUwQT09
Meeting-ID: 938 6612 4430
Kenncode: 926201

BGSE Workshop II

Alexander Winter, BGSE
"Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents"

Abstract

A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One example of this setting is the efficient division of a fixed (monetary) budget between

two competing departments. We first characterize all implementable mechanisms under arbitrary correlation. Second, we study when there exists a mechanism that yields the principal a higher payoff then she could receive by choosing the ex-ante optimal decision without consulting the agents. In the budget example, a profitable mechanism exists if and only if the information of one department is also relevant for the expected returns of the other department.

Zoom: *https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/96045476214?pwd=VjkvMUowVDFBeHovZmtxYVExb0d2dz09*

BGSE Workshop III

Markus Möller, Univ of Cologne
"Regret-Free Truth-Telling in School Choice"

Abstract
Regret-Free Truth-Telling in School Choice The Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Matching Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property than strategy-proofness and was introduced by Fernandez (2020). We also show that there is no efficient matching rule that Pareto dominates a stable matching rule and is regret-free truth-telling.

Zoom: *https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/96045476214?pwd=VjkvMUowVDFBeHovZmtxYVExb0d2dz09*

BGSE Workshop IV

Akis Georgiadis-Harris, LSE
"Information Acquisition and the Timing of Actions"

Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which the decision maker lacks control over the timing of their action. It characterizes the optimal dynamic experiment when the decision maker can flexibly choose all relevant aspects of the information they acquire. The cost of an experiment depends on the quantity of information it produces. At the optimum, the decision maker concentrates resources in generating a single piece of breakthrough news, contradicting their plan of action. In the absence of such news, the decision maker becomes more confident in their intentions. This leads them to sacrifice the frequency with which breakthroughs arrive in order to increase their impact on choice behaviour. These are in stark contrast with the case where the timing of actions is endogenous, in which breakthroughs confirm beliefs, and the resolution of the trade-off between frequency and precision is reversed.

Zoom-Link: https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/96045476214?pwd=VjkvMUowVDFBeHovZmtxYVExb0d2dz09

Bonn MacroHistory Seminar

Tianyi Wang, Princeton Univ.
"Waves of Empowerment: Black Radio and the Civil Rights Movement"

Abstract
In the early 1960s, as the civil rights movement was gaining momentum, Black-oriented radio stations were broadcasting across large swaths of the South. This paper uses newly digitized data to provide the first empirical evidence on the effects of Black radio on the civil rights movement. I find strong evidence that Black radio increased Black political participation and activism in the South during the early 1960s, as measured by Black voter registration and the presence of a local chapter of the civil rights group NAACP. For mechanisms, I find evidence consistent with Black radio increasing the reach of civil rights groups and providing positive role models to African Americans. Moreover, results suggest that exposure to Black radio translated into substantive economic and political gains for the Black community in the form of greater state aid and legislative support for civil rights bills. Much of the effects took place before the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation, highlighting the significance of Black radio to the Black community.

Zoom: https://uni-bonn.zoom.us/j/99710470576?pwd=WnZ1b21vbWhuUEtlT0w5NURBNng1Zz09

Meeting ID: 997 1047 0576
Passcode: 988946

YEP Seminar ECONtribute

Mark Marner-Hausen, CGS, Univ. of Cologne
"Laboratory Experiment on High Frequency Trading"

Please refer to: https://econtribute.de/events/yep-seminar/
Zoom Seminar, Zoom URL TBA via mailing list
For further details please contact tim.bock@uni-bonn.de

Redaktionsschluss / Deadline
BONN ECON NEWS April 04 – 08, 2022
Wednesday, March 30, 2022
12:00
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