

# Information and Dynamic Incentives

332121012/MA ECON AM MIT INFODIN



## Content and learning outcomes

<b>Content</b>	Dynamic models of signaling and communication; models of repeated contracting under moral hazard and adverse selection with and without commitment.
<b>Learning outcomes</b>	Students study the impact of asymmetric information on market and contracting outcomes in dynamic environments. They learn to apply game theoretic tools to understand contracts and institutions as optimal outcomes under asymmetric information.

## Teaching and learning methods

Type of course/learning methods	Topic	Language of instruction	Group size	Contact time	Workload [h]
Lecture	Information and Dynamic Incentives	English	open	4 hours	60
Self-study					165

## Prerequisites

<b>obligatory</b>	none
<b>recommended</b>	Basic Module <i>Microeconomics</i>

## Degree program allocation

Study Program	obligatory/ elective	Semester
Master of Science Economics Study Field: Microeconomic Theory	elective	2nd
Master of Science Mathematics	elective	2nd

## Requirements for the awarding of credit points (ECTS)

Requirements for the awarding of credit points (ECTS)		Credits
<b>Prerequisites for participation</b>	none	7,5 CP
<b>Types of Assessment (graded, incl. weighting factor)</b>	Written or oral exam or term paper (graded, 100%) - English	
<b>Examination language</b>		

## Course Cycle

Course Cycle	Workload	Duration
Winter term <input type="checkbox"/> Winter and Summer term <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Summer term <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>225 h</b>	<b>1 Term</b>

## Module coordination

<b>Teaching person</b>	See <a href="https://basis.uni-bonn.de">https://basis.uni-bonn.de</a>
<b>Module coordinator</b>	Prof. Dr. Dezső Szalay
<b>Institute/Department</b>	Department of Economics

## Further Information

<b>(Reading lists, information links etc.)</b>	The recommended literature will be announced at the beginning of the course.
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