We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly ...
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Seminars
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BGSE Workshop
This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private ...
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Seminars
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BGSE Workshop
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. I microfound the cost of an ...
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Seminars
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BGSE Workshop
This paper studies the dynamic completion of interrelated projects. A decision maker allocates, at each point in time, a fixed unit of attention to projects ...
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Seminars
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BGSE Workshop
The classic wisdom-of-the-crowd problem asks how a principal can “aggregate” information about the unknown state of the world from agents without understanding ...
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Seminars
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Micro Theory Seminar
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