

Information and Dynamic Incentives

MA ECON AM MIT INFODIN



Content and learning outcome

Content Dynamic models of signaling and communication; models of repeated contracting under moral hazard and adverse selection with and without commitment.

Learning outcome Students study the impact of asymmetric information on market and contracting outcomes in dynamic environments. They learn to apply game theoretic tools to understand contracts and institutions as optimal outcomes under asymmetric information.

Teaching and learning methods

Type of course/ learning methods	Topic	Language of instruction	Group size	Contact time	Workload [h]
Lecture	Information and Dynamic Incentives	English	30	4 hours	60
Self-study					165

Prerequisites

obligatory none

recommended Basic Module *Microeconomics*

Degree program allocation

Study Program/Study Field/Module Number/Lecture Number	obligatory/ elective	Semester
Economics (M.Sc.)/Microeconomic Theory/332121012/33202101	elective	3 rd

Requirements for the awarding of credit points (ECTS)

Requirements for the awarding of credit points (ECTS)		Credits
Prerequisites for participation	none	7,5 CP
Types of Assessment Examination language	Written or oral exam or term paper (graded, 100%) - English	

Course Cycle	Workload	Duration
Winter term <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Summer term <input type="checkbox"/>	Winter and Summer term <input type="checkbox"/>	225 h
		1 Term

Module coordination

Teaching person See <https://basis.uni-bonn.de>

Module coordinator Prof. Dr. Dezső Szalay

Institute/Department Department of Economics

Further Information

Literature The recommended literature will be announced at the beginning of the course