Cyril Monnet - University of Berne

"Truth-telling in a fully decentralized system. An impossibility theorem and experimental evidence"

Abstract

We show that truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be implemented as a unique equilibrium in a completely decentralized environment. We conduct an experiment to confirm the difficulties of eliciting truthful reporting in the lab. Our work provides a theoretical underpinning of the need for oracles and the related “oracle problem.”

Additional information:

Speaker: Cyril Monnet
Time: Wednesday, 17.05.2023, 14:45 - 16:00
Location: Faculty Lounge, Room 0.036 / Online via Zoom
- Zoom-Link
Further links:
- Cyril Monnet's webpage
- Link to paper
Organizer: Finance Group
Contact:
- Almut Lunkenheimer
- +49 228 73-9228
- ifs@uni-bonn.de