Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

BGSE Workshop

Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (University of Bonn) 19.10.2022

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. Our main result is that the Coase Conjecture fails: the monopolist’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor.
Time
Wednesday, 19.10.22 - 12:00 PM - 01:00 PM
Topic
Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture
Target groups

Students

Researchers

Location
Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)
Reservation
not required
Organizer
BGSE
Contact
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