Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

BGSE Workshop Archive

Sophie Kreutzkamp (BGSE) 30.11.2022
Nov 30, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

This paper studies costly information acquisition and transmission. An expert communicates with a decision-maker about a state of nature by sending a cheap-talk message. In efficient equilibria, the expert generally reveals all acquired information to the decision-maker. I show the existence of efficient equilibria under general conditions. For the class of posterior separable cost structures, I derive properties of efficient experiments. Under posterior-mean preferences, any cheap-talk problem is solved by a convex combination of two bi-pooling policies. The best bi-pooling policies are characterized for the uniform-quadratic case. Contrary to existing cheap-talk models, monotone partitions are not always optimal.

Ole Rücker (BGSE) 23.11.2022
Nov 23, 2022 from 12:00 to 12:40

I investigate competition between news media firms under the assumptions that consumers get their information about political topics from these firms and that consumers prefer news that validates their views. I show that for topics where the consumers have sufficiently heterogeneous opinions, news media firms may withhold information which can lead to a polarization of political parties. In particular, the median voter theorem does not necessarily apply.

Melina Cosentino (BGSE) 16.11.2022
Nov 16, 2022 from 12:00 to 12:40

I adapt the Hotelling-Downs model with three parties and add an ''antipartisan''-component. Antipartisans vote for the party located furthest away from the party they dislike. While the standard game without antipartisanship has no equilibrium in pure strategies, antipartisanship allows for three types of outcomes: in equilibrium, parties spread over the spectrum, locate on extreme positions, or no equilibrium exists. The model provides a theoretical explanation for phenomena as those observed in Brazil in 2018: an exogenous increase in the share of antipartisans, followed by relocation on the spectrum towards the extrema. I characterise conditions under which such relocations can be explained by antipartisanship only.

Lucas Pahl (University of Bonn) 09.11.2022
Nov 09, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential in every equivalent game if and only if the index of the component is nonzero. This provides an index-theoretic characterization of the concept of hyperstable components of equilibria in generic extensive-form games, first formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). We explore the consequences of the result for the literature on refinements.

Mengxi Zhang (University of Bonn) 26.10.2022
Oct 26, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our main purpose is to provide a convenient analytical model that explains both the pattern of observed customer behavior and the pattern of insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs, or menus of insurance with coverage limits- premium pairs. The main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional.

Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (University of Bonn) 19.10.2022
Oct 19, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer’s valuation is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether deploy the previous period’s contract or to replace it with a new one. Our main result is that the Coase Conjecture fails: the monopolist’s payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor.

Shaofei Jiang (University of Bonn) 12.10.2022
Oct 12, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. I microfound the cost of an experiment via a Wald's sequential sampling problem and show that it equals the expected reduction in a weighted log-likelihood ratio function evaluated at the sender's belief. I focus on equilibria that satisfy the D1 criterion. The equilibrium outcome depends on the relative costs of drawing good and bad news in the experiment. If bad news is more costly, there exists a unique separating equilibrium outcome, and the receiver unambiguously benefits from the sender's private information. If good news is sufficiently more costly, the single-crossing property fails. There exists a continuum of pooling equilibria, and the receiver strictly suffers from sender private information in some pooling equilibria.

Francisco Poggi (University of Mannheim) 02.11.2022
Nov 02, 2022 from 12:00 to 01:00

This paper studies the dynamic completion of interrelated projects. A decision maker allocates, at each point in time, a fixed unit of attention to projects that are completed in the form of breakthroughs. The agent's final payoff depends on the set of completed projects at the chosen stopping time. After completing a project, the agent might regret the attention that was already allocated to an incomplete project. I construct a partial order in the set of allocation policies that is based on regret, and show that the expected payoff of an allocation policy is increasing in such order. Moreover, I provide sufficient conditions in the distribution of completion times such that the optimal policy for complementary projects is regret-free. I apply these results to study the canonical problem of two complementary projects with uncertain but constant rate of completion and characterise the optimal attention allocation policy in that case.

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