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SUMMARY:Shaily Bahuguna (BGSE) 25.01.2023
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230125T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230125T130000
DTSTAMP:20260512T112113Z
UID:f81497ef37b24a97b81bc15bf1ab0835@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221125T145606Z
DESCRIPTION:Sniping/last-minute bidding is an unusual bidding technique th
 at has been extensively studied in empirical studies of eBay auctions\, wh
 ere bidders compete in a modified sealed-bid\, second-price auction format
  and depart from the predictions of standard economic theory. Using Kősze
 gi and Rabin’s (2006) theory of reference-dependent preferences\, I buil
 d a game theoretic model that explains not only late bidding but also over
 bidding in a private-value eBay auction setting involving a sophisticated\
 , rational bidder and a naive\, loss-averse bidder. The latter suffers fro
 m pseudo-endowment effect which causes willingness to pay (WTP) for the it
 em to increase while the auction runs. By reserving her bid for late in th
 e game\, a rational bidder can prevent intermediate information revelation
  about relative valuation structure to her opponent. This discourages re-b
 idding for the loss-averse bidder\, thereby preventing higher prices and j
 ustifying sniping.
LAST-MODIFIED:20230125T142919Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/bgse-workshop/shaily-ba
 huguna-bgse-25-10.2022
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