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SUMMARY:Shaofei Jiang (University of Bonn) 12.10.2022
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221012T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221012T130000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123617Z
UID:f45145d22359483cb5f4be5fc13d2bce@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221021T135425Z
DESCRIPTION:I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately a
 nd partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. I microfoun
 d the cost of an experiment via a Wald's sequential sampling problem and s
 how that it equals the expected reduction in a weighted log-likelihood rat
 io function evaluated at the sender's belief. I focus on equilibria that s
 atisfy the D1 criterion. The equilibrium outcome depends on the relative c
 osts of drawing good and bad news in the experiment. If bad news is more c
 ostly\, there exists a unique separating equilibrium outcome\, and the rec
 eiver unambiguously benefits from the sender's private information. If goo
 d news is sufficiently more costly\, the single-crossing property fails. T
 here exists a continuum of pooling equilibria\, and the receiver strictly 
 suffers from sender private information in some pooling equilibria.
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T094416Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/bgse-workshop/shaofei-j
 iang-university-of-bonn-12-10.2022
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