BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Plone.org//NONSGML plone.app.event//EN
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Berlin
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Alp Atakan (Queen Mary) 11.01.2023
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230111T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230111T174500
DTSTAMP:20260519T215248Z
UID:06731c092df64bada79c1a20d6ede747@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221125T151449Z
DESCRIPTION:We study a common-value auction in which a large number of ide
 ntical\, indivisible object are sold to a large number of ex-ante identica
 l bidders with unit demand. Bidders are initially uninformed but can acqui
 re information from multiple sources that differ in accuracy and cost. We 
 define a cost-accuracy ratio for each available source of information. The
  minimum value of this cost-accuracy ratio among all information sources f
 ully determines the limit price distribution and the information content o
 f the auction's price. Information is aggregated if and only if the minimu
 m cost-accuracy ratio is equal to zero. We also characterize all equilibri
 a of the auction for posterior separable information costs with a sufficie
 ntly rich set of experiments. In this case information is aggregated if an
 d only if the cost function is differentiable at the prior.
LAST-MODIFIED:20230125T141459Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/al
 p-atakan-queen-mary-11-01.2023
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Berlin
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Berlin
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20221030T020000
TZNAME:CET
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
END:VCALENDAR