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SUMMARY:Ernesto Rivera Mora (University of Arizona) 24.01.2023
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230124T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230124T174500
DTSTAMP:20260528T021737Z
UID:cbdf402ef96c4a2788f2c3ef6078b524@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20230125T142112Z
DESCRIPTION:The paper analyzes information sharing in neutral mechanisms w
 hen an informed party will face future interactions with an uninformed par
 ty. Neutral mechanisms are mechanisms that do not rely on (1) the provisio
 n of evidence\, (2) conducting experiments\, (3) verifying the state\, or 
 (4) changing the after-game (i.e.\, the available choices and payoffs of f
 uture interactions). They include cheap talk\, long cheap talk\, noisy com
 munication\, mediation\, money burning\, and transfer schemes\, among othe
 r mechanisms. To address this question\, the paper develops a reduced-form
  approach that characterizes the agents’ payoffs in terms of belief-base
 d utilities. This effectively induces a psychological game\, where the psy
 chological preferences summarize information-sharing incentives. [...]
LAST-MODIFIED:20230125T142118Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/er
 nesto-rivera-mora-university-of-arizona-24-01.2023
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