BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Plone.org//NONSGML plone.app.event//EN
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/Berlin
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Francesco Squintani (University of Warwick) 14.12.2022
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221214T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221214T174500
DTSTAMP:20260521T194415Z
UID:de216d383a4a4d98885c46a1f32f0f53@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221125T151212Z
DESCRIPTION:I study strategic information disclosure in networks. When age
 nts' preferences are sufficiently diverse\, the optimal network is the lin
 e in which the agents are ordered according to their ideologies. Such opti
 mal networks obtain as Nash equilibria of a game in which each link requir
 es sponsorship by both connected agents\, and are the unique strongly pair
 wise stable networks. These results overturns classical results of non-str
 ategic information transmission in networks\, where the optimal and pairwi
 se stable network is the star.\nIn political economy environments such as 
 networks of policy-makers\, interest groups\, or judges\, these results su
 ggest positive and normative rationales for "horizontal" links between lik
 e-minded agents in political networks\, as opposed to hierarchical network
 s\, that have been shown to be optimal in organizations where agents' pref
 erences are more closely aligned.
LAST-MODIFIED:20221220T162451Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/fr
 ancesco-squintani-university-of-warwick-14-12.2022
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Berlin
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Berlin
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20221030T020000
TZNAME:CET
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
END:VCALENDAR