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SUMMARY:Harry Pei (Northwestern) 26.10.2022
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221026T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221026T174500
DTSTAMP:20260511T174809Z
UID:d655370ae1cc48c7b51ec6a7f2c89b7a@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221021T141619Z
DESCRIPTION:A patient seller decides whether to build a reputation for exe
 rting high effort in front of a sequence of consumers. Each consumer decid
 es whether to trust the seller after she observes the number of times that
  the seller took each of his actions in the last K periods\, but not the o
 rder with which these actions were taken. I show that (i) the seller’s p
 ayoff from building a reputation is at least his commitment payoff for all
  K and in all equilibria\, and (ii) the seller sustains his reputation for
  exert high effort in all equilibria if and only if K is below some cutoff
 . Although a larger K allows more consumers to observe the seller’s oppo
 rtunistic behavior\, it weakens their incentives to punish the seller afte
 r they observe opportunistic behavior. This effect undermines the seller
 ’s reputational incentives and lowers consumers’ welfare.
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T094416Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/ha
 rry-pei-northwestern-26-10.2022
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