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SUMMARY:Axel Niemeyer (BGSE) 30.11.2022
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221130T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221130T174500
DTSTAMP:20260518T185337Z
UID:3c2dd1fa2c0849ff8d7ff58c44031533@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221125T150745Z
DESCRIPTION:Posterior implementation is a solution concept for mechanism d
 esign with interdependent values. It requires that each agent’s strategy
  is optimal against the strategies of other agents for every possible mess
 age profile. Green and Laffont (1987) give a geometric characterization of
  posterior implementable social choice functions for binary collective dec
 ision problems with two agents and non-transferable utility. This paper ge
 neralizes the analysis to any finite number n of agents\, with three main 
 insights. First\, posterior implementable social choice functions are post
 erior implementable by score voting: each agent submits a number from a se
 t of consecutive integers\; the collective decision is determined by wheth
 er or not the sum exceeds a given quota. Second\, the possibility for post
 erior implementation depends crucially on the number of agents: in generic
  environments with n ≥ 3 agents\, a (responsive) social choice function 
 is posterior implementable [...]
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T094416Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/ir
 ene-lo-stanford-university-30-11.2022
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