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SUMMARY:Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University\, UCL) 16.11.2022
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221116T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20221116T174500
DTSTAMP:20260519T215248Z
UID:020b98a9837942ca9c20c8ba396fb45e@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20221115T154704Z
DESCRIPTION:We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political
  platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy\, 
 a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies\
 , and a narrative. We conceptualize narratives as subjective models that a
 ttribute a commonly valued outcome to (potentially spurious) postulated ca
 uses. When quantifi…ed against empirical observations\, these models gen
 erate a shared belief among coalition members over the outcome as a functi
 on of its postulated causes. The intensity of this belief and the members
 ’intrinsic attitudes to the policy determine the strength of the coaliti
 on’s mobilization. Only platforms that generate maximal mobilization pre
 vail in equilibrium. Our equilibrium characterization demonstrates how fal
 se narratives can be detrimental for the common good\, and how political f
 ragmentation leads to their proliferation.
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T094417Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/ra
 n-spiegler-tel-aviv-university-ucl-16-11.2022
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