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SUMMARY:Victor Augias (Sciences Po) 18.01.2023
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230118T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20230118T174500
DTSTAMP:20260511T190433Z
UID:5297f558563646f49b036e67db15c72f@www.econ.uni-bonn.de
CREATED:20230125T141733Z
DESCRIPTION:We study how to optimally design non-market mechanisms for all
 ocating scarce resources\, taking into consideration agents' investment in
 centives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality
 \, such as seats in a university\, to a heterogeneous population of agents
 . She commits ex-ante to a possibly random allocation rule\, contingent on
  a unidimensional characteristic of the agents she intrinsically values. T
 he principal cannot resort to monetary transfers. Agents have a strict pre
 ference for allocation and can undertake a costly investment to improve th
 eir characteristic before it is revealed to the principal. We show that wh
 ile random allocation rules have the effect of encouraging investment\, es
 pecially at the top of the characteristic distribution\, deterministic pas
 s-fail allocation rules\, such as exams with a pass grade\, prove to be op
 timal.
LAST-MODIFIED:20230125T141822Z
URL:https://www.econ.uni-bonn.de/micro/en/seminars/micro-theory-seminar/vi
 ctor-augias-sciences-po-18-1.2023
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