Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

BGSE Workshop

Patrick Lahr (BGSE) 21.12.2022

We consider a multi-sender cheap talk model, where the receiver faces uncertainty over whether senders have aligned or state-independent preferences. This uncertainty generates a tradeoff between giving sufficient weight to the most informed aligned senders and minimizing the influence of the unaligned. We show that preference uncertainty diminishes the benefits from specialization, i.e., senders receiving signals with more dispersed accuracy. When preference uncertainty becomes large, it negates them entirely, causing qualified majority voting to become the optimal form of communication. Our results demonstrate how political polarization endangers the ability of society to reap the benefits of specialization in knowledge.
Time
Wednesday, 21.12.2022 - 12:00 - 13:00
Topic
The Fragility of Specialized Advice
Target groups

Students

Researchers

Location
Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)
Reservation
not required
Organizer
BGSE
Contact
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