Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

BGSE Workshop

Sophie Kreutzkamp (BGSE) 30.11.2022

This paper studies costly information acquisition and transmission. An expert communicates with a decision-maker about a state of nature by sending a cheap-talk message. In efficient equilibria, the expert generally reveals all acquired information to the decision-maker. I show the existence of efficient equilibria under general conditions. For the class of posterior separable cost structures, I derive properties of efficient experiments. Under posterior-mean preferences, any cheap-talk problem is solved by a convex combination of two bi-pooling policies. The best bi-pooling policies are characterized for the uniform-quadratic case. Contrary to existing cheap-talk models, monotone partitions are not always optimal.
Time
Wednesday, 30.11.2022 - 12:00 - 13:00
Topic
Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games
Target groups

Students

Researchers

Location
Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)
Reservation
not required
Organizer
BGSE
Contact
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