Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

Micro Theory Seminar

Ernesto Rivera Mora (University of Arizona) 24.01.2023

The paper analyzes information sharing in neutral mechanisms when an informed party will face future interactions with an uninformed party. Neutral mechanisms are mechanisms that do not rely on (1) the provision of evidence, (2) conducting experiments, (3) verifying the state, or (4) changing the after-game (i.e., the available choices and payoffs of future interactions). They include cheap talk, long cheap talk, noisy communication, mediation, money burning, and transfer schemes, among other mechanisms. To address this question, the paper develops a reduced-form approach that characterizes the agents’ payoffs in terms of belief-based utilities. This effectively induces a psychological game, where the psychological preferences summarize information-sharing incentives. [...]
Time
Tuesday, 24.01.2023 - 16:30 - 17:45
Topic
Neutral Mechanisms: On the Feasibility of Information Sharing
Target groups

Students

Researchers

Location
virtual
Reservation
not required
Organizer
BGSE
Contact
Wird geladen