Universität Bonn

Department of Economics

Micro Theory Seminar

Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University, UCL) 16.11.2022

We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies, and a narrative. We conceptualize narratives as subjective models that attribute a commonly valued outcome to (potentially spurious) postulated causes. When quantifi…ed against empirical observations, these models generate a shared belief among coalition members over the outcome as a function of its postulated causes. The intensity of this belief and the members’intrinsic attitudes to the policy determine the strength of the coalition’s mobilization. Only platforms that generate maximal mobilization prevail in equilibrium. Our equilibrium characterization demonstrates how false narratives can be detrimental for the common good, and how political fragmentation leads to their proliferation.
Time
Wednesday, 16.11.22 - 04:30 PM - 05:45 PM
Topic
False Narratives and Political Mobilization
Target groups

Students

Researchers

Location
Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room
Reservation
not required
Organizer
BGSE
Contact
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