We study a common-value auction in which a large number of identical, indivisible object are sold to a large number of ex-ante identical bidders with unit ...
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Seminars
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Micro Theory Seminar
I study strategic information disclosure in networks. When agents' preferences are sufficiently diverse, the optimal network is the line in which the agents ...
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Seminars
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Micro Theory Seminar
This paper studies learning from multiple informed agents where each agent has a small piece of information about the unknown state of the world in the form of ...
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Seminars
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Micro Theory Seminar
Posterior implementation is a solution concept for mechanism design with interdependent values. It requires that each agent’s strategy is optimal against the ...
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Micro Theory Seminar
I study information design in selection problems. There is a receiver who selects one out of many alternatives and takes an action, and a sender who transmits ...
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BGSE Workshop
Sniping/last-minute bidding is an unusual bidding technique that has been extensively studied in empirical studies of eBay auctions, where bidders compete in a ...
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Seminars
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BGSE Workshop
I study the effect of misspecified communication among voters in a political competition setting. Parties advertise by sending information about their ...
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BGSE Workshop
We consider a multi-sender cheap talk model, where the receiver faces uncertainty over whether senders have aligned or state-independent preferences. This ...
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BGSE Workshop
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Located in
Seminars
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BGSE Workshop