I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. When only non-routine tasks are informative about a ...
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Micro Theory Seminar
A decision-maker must accept or reject a privately informed agent. The agent always wants to be accepted, while the decision-maker wants to accept only a ...
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Micro Theory Seminar
The paper analyzes information sharing in neutral mechanisms when an informed party will face future interactions with an uninformed party. Neutral mechanisms ...
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Micro Theory Seminar
We study how to optimally design non-market mechanisms for allocating scarce resources, taking into consideration agents' investment incentives. A principal ...
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Micro Theory Seminar
Am Mittwoch, den 01.03.2023 findet die Informationsveranstaltung zur Wahl der freien Wahlpflichtmodule um 18:30-19:15 Uhr online via Zoom statt. Besonders ...
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